Game-theoretic models have been used to analyze design problems ranging from multi-objective design optimization to decentralized design, and from design for market systems to policy design. However, existing studies are primarily analytical in nature, which start with a number of assumptions about the individual decisions, the information available to the players, and the solution concept (generally, the Nash equilibrium). There is a lack of studies related to engineering design that rigorously evaluate the validity of these assumptions or that of the predictions from the models. Hence, the usefulness of these models to realistic engineering systems design has been severely limited. In this paper, we take a step towards addressing this gap. Using an example of crowdsourcing for engineering design, we illustrate how the analytical game-theoretic models and behavioral experimentation can be synergistically used to gain a complete understanding of design situations. Analytical models describe what players with assumed behaviors and cognitive capabilities would do under specified conditions, and the behavioral experiments shed light on how individuals actually behave. The paper contributes to the design literature in multiple ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, it is a first attempt at integrated theoretical and experimental game theoretic analysis in design. We illustrate how the analytical models can be used to design behavioral experiments, which, in turn, can be used to estimate parameters, refine models, and inform further development of the theory. Second, we present a simple experiment to understand behaviors of individuals in a design crowdsourcing problem. The results of the experiment show new insights on using crowdsourcing contests for design.
1 Introduction
Game Theory in Engineering Systems Design
Game theory is becoming an increasingly important tool for engineering design research. One of the first models of the design process using game-theory was by Vincent [1] . In this model, a multi-objective design problem is assigned to several decentralized designers where each designer is responsible for a subset of objectives. The decentralized design problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, with the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally change their strategy. The model was extended by Lewis and Mistree [2] for modeling different types of interactions between decision makers-sequential, collaborative, and isolated. The resulting game-based design framework was later used for developing ranged sets of specifications using design capability indices [3] .
Building on the non-cooperative game model of decentralized design, studies have been carried out to analyze the convergence characteristics of the design process, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. Chanron and Lewis [4] assume that decision makers follow an iterative process of communicating best responses to the decisions made by other decision makers, and analyze the convergence of solutions to Nash equilibria. Devendorf and Lewis [5] use the linear systems theory to analyze the dependence of system stability on the solution process architecture.
Game theoretic models have inspired the development of efficient protocols for information exchange in design. As it is well known that the quality of Nash equilibria may be inferior than the Pareto optimal solutions, various researchers have proposed modifications to the standard information exchange (or best replies) and developed protocols for bringing the resulting design closer to Pareto optimal solutions. As an example, Ciucci et al. [6] develop strategies for passing additional information to facilitate convergence to Pareto-optimal designs. Fernandez et al. [7] present a coordination mechanism for establishing shared design spaces and exploring regions of acceptable performance. Rao and Freiheit [8] model a multiobjective design problem as a game, and develop a modified game theoretic method to obtain Pareto optimal solutions. Takai [9] models a scenario where a design project has both team and individual components, and analyzes the conditions that lead to cooperation between the designers, thereby leading to good system-level outcome.
assess the use of crowdsourcing for evaluating engineering creativity by asking undergraduate students to rate the originality of solutions to design problems. The authors show that expert-level ratings can be extracted from non-expert students. Gerth and coauthors [33] hypothesize that there is a relationship between task characteristics, individual expertise, and quality of the design outcome. The authors use a simple agent-based model to validate the hypothesis. Kudrowitz and Wallace [34] crowdsource the task of rapidly evaluating large sets of product ideas on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The ideas are presented in the form of sketches, and individuals in the crowd provide ratings of creativity, novelty and usefulness of the ideas.
These studies focus on utilizing the inputs from the participants. Since everyone is rewarded equally for their input (irrespective of the quality of their input), the questions such as a) whether someone would participate in the study, and b) how much effort they would put into the problem, etc. do not arise. However, if individuals are participating in a crowdsourcing contest, in which they may not win the prize, the issue of incentives becomes important. An example of such a scenario is DARPA's Fast Adaptable Next-Generation Ground Vehicle (FANG) challenge [35] . DARPA explored the use of crowdsourcing for designing and developing a heavy, amphibious infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) through prize-based design competitions. Such challenges require significant effort (time and money) from the participants. In general, participation in such contests is high if the probability of winning is high. However, if more people participate in the crowdsourcing contest, the probability of winning of an individual decreases. Game theoretic models can be used to understand the effects of incentives on individual decisions and their interactions with other decision makers. In the following section, we discuss a foundational model of tournaments from non-cooperative game theory, which can be used to model a crowdsourcing tournament.
Modeling Tournaments as Non-Cooperative Games
Existing work related to tournaments has been carried out within the framework of contest theory. The theory of contests is a part of economics dealing with situations such as sports contests, rent seeking contests, conflicts and litigations where individual decision makers expend resources so as to increase their probability of winning [36] . The general approach within contest theory is to model a tournament as a game and to study the equilibrium and its stability. Various game-theoretic models of tournaments have been developed to provide insights about specific tournament design options. Terwiesch and Quality functions quantify the quality of the solution (q i ) proposed by the actors, as a function of the participant characteristics, such as knowledge and expertise (K i ) and the inputs, such as effort (e i ). It is assumed that the quality of each solution is independent of the characteristics and the inputs of other participants:
Contest success functions provide each contestant's probability of winning as a function of the quality of all solutions [38] ,
Conceptually, contest success functions are similar to probabilistic choice functions used within the design literature [39] .
Generally, the functional form of the contest success functions is assumed in the formulation. The probability is assumed to have the following additive form:
where f (q i ) is a non-negative increasing function. Two functional forms of f (q i ) are commonly used. The first form, referred to as the "power form" is:
. For a two-player scenario,
Hence, the probability of winning is dependent on the ratio of the quality of the submitted solutions. The second form is f (q i ) = e kq i with k > 0, which results in a multinomial "logit form" of the contest success function P i = players, this reduces to
Hence, the probability of winning depends on the difference in the quality. The latter formulation can be derived both axiomatically and stochastically [38, 40] .
Payoff functions relate the tournament design variables to the individual payoffs. For example, in a winner-takes-all contest, the payoff of an individual can be defined as the expected value of the prize,
where Π is the amount of the prize and C i is the cost incurred in developing the solution.
Using the quality function, contest success function, and the payoff function, the non-cooperative game is formulated.
The Nash equilibrium of the game is generally used as the solution of the game. At the Nash equilibrium, player i chooses the input (e i ) that is a best response to other players' best responses. The formulation can be used to quantify the effects of different tournament design concepts on the equilibrium effort invested by the players as a function of the exogenous parameters such as the prize, endogenous parameters such as the expertise and effort, and the structure of the game, such as winner-takes-all or auction style.
In the following section, we discuss a simple design crowdsourcing scenario, analyze it using this game theoretic model of contests, and generate different hypotheses. The hypotheses are tested using a behavioral economics experiment.
3 Designing an Experiment to Assess Game-Theoretic Models of Crowdsourcing in Design
Modeling an Engineering Design Problem as a Search Problem
While there are many different views of design, one commonly accepted perspective is that designing is a process of searching through the space of design parameters, which characterize the structure of an artifact, to find a point that satisfies the need in the best possible way [41] . Papalambros and Wilde [42] argue that design problems can be viewed as optimization problems, where the designers strive to satisfy the needs within the constraints of available resources. They highlight that the entire process of design can be viewed from the perspective of optimization. In their words, ".. 1. A designer's goal is to find the best design (defined by certain criteria).
2. Designers need to evaluate the performance of candidate designs, either through simulation models or physical experiments. 3 . Experiments incur costs. Here, the term "cost" is used more generally. Costs can either be monetary cost or effort (computational, personnel, etc.). 4 . Greater number of experiments result in a better understanding of the design space, and therefore, better quality of the design.
If a design problem is being solved by individuals in a crowdsourcing tournament, the expected payoff is determined by the quality of the designs by other designers also, see Equation (3). For a contestant, greater experimentation implies better quality, which in-turn results in a higher probability of winning, but also greater cost. If there are two participants in a tournament, the dependence on the parameters is as shown in Figure 1 .
Fig. 1: Relationship between parameters
To simulate this scenario, we designed a behavioral economics experiment, where the participants are asked to optimize a design characterized by a single parameter (x ∈ [−100, 100]), whose performance is quantified by an unknown function,
Each participant can request the value of the function for a specified x at a cost of c tokens. Each player plays the game against one other player, randomly selected during each period. At the end of each period, the participant whose design parameter is the closest to the best possible design wins the fixed prize (Π). In this specific case, we asked the participants to minimize F(x). Further details of the experimental setup are provided in Section 3.3.
This simple optimization problem is an abstraction of many complex design problems. It models the four characteristics of real design problems, listed above. Although it does not account for all the nuances of complex systems design problems, it is complete in the sense that it allows us to test behavioral assumptions and predictions from the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, and facilitates in gaining insights about participants' decision making behavior. There are many advantages of starting with such a simple model. First, it is general enough to represent a wide variety of design problems.
Second, the domain independent nature of the problem significantly reduces the variations among subjects due to diversity in knowledge and expertise, thereby reducing the resulting noise in the results. Such a simple design is preferred so that when the effects are observed, researchers can attribute them to the differences in the treatments. In a complex experiment, additional variables introduce additional sources of noise, which make it difficult to directly attribute the effects to the treatments. Therefore, so long as the missed variables do not interact with the treatments in influencing outcomes in reality,
it is preferred to employ such simplistic designs from the behavioral economics standpoint.
The optimization problem in the experiment could have been posed as a specific design optimization problem, e.g.,
optimizing the dimensions of a beam under certain dimensional and strength constraints. However, we avoided such a problem because of two reasons. First, it would have restricted the participation of student subjects to specific groups who are familiar the problem domain. The second (and more important) reason is that it would have introduced additional noise in the data because of the varying knowledge and expertise related to the specific problem among the subjects. The goal in behavioral economics experiments is to control for noise from the parameters that have not been considered in the theoretical model to the extent possible.
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Problem
In the context of the model discussed in Section 2.2, the participants are engaged in two-player contests during each period. The effort corresponds to the number of different points for which a participant requests the value of the function (i.e, the number of tries). For participant i, we represent the number of tries as e i . Therefore, the total cost incurred by the i th participant is
Since the problem does not require any domain-specific knowledge, we assume that the participants are homogeneous in terms of expertise and knowledge (K i ). The quality of a design (q i ) generated by designer i is a monotonically decreasing function of the absolute difference between the optimum point and the best value of F(x) generated by the participant. We assume that the quality is only dependent on the number of tries, i.e.,
The probability of winning the contest for each player is given by Equations (4) or (5), depending on the form of the contest success function. Since this is a winner-takes-all contest, the expected value of the prize for each player is given by Equation (6). power form is used, the expected payoffs of the two participants are:
where m > 0. On the other hand, if the logit form is used, the expected payoffs are:
where k > 0. Participant i chooses the value of e i to maximize E(π i ) in response to e −i where −i represents the other participant. If the functional form of q i = q i (e i ) is known, the Nash equilibrium for the game can be calculated. Note that the Nash equilibrium would depend on the functional form of the quality functions, q i , the contest success function chosen, and the parameters m and k. These in turn depend on the specific problem and the characteristics of individuals participating in the contest.
Considering that the quality of the solution is monotonically increasing with the effort, two possible functional forms for the quality function (QF) are the linear form q i = αe i and the exponential form q i = α exp(βe i ), where α, β, and γ are constants. The combinations of these CSFs and QFs result in four possible game formulations, as shown in Table 1 . In a two-player scenario, each player maximizes the corresponding expected payoff function.
Consider the first example where the quality function is linearly dependent on the effort, i.e., q i (e i ) = αe i where the constant α is the same for all participants. Assuming the power form of the contest success function, Equations (9) and (10) can be written as
The payoffs of the participants are used to derive the rational reaction sets (RRS). A participant's RRS consists of the optimal strategies in response to the strategies of other participants. The rational reaction sets of the two players, derived using the Corresponding Author: Panchal, J. H. − 10 − Paper number: MD-14-1665 ASME Journal of Mechanical Design Table 1 : The rational reaction sets and Nash equilibria for different choices of quality functions (QF) and contest success functions (CSF) for two-player games.
Power Form
Unique Nash eq.: e i = e −i = Πm 4c
All points that satisfy the equation above.
Logit Form
All points that satisfy the equation above. 
and the Nash equilibrium for this case, which is obtained by simultaneously solving RRS 1 and RRS 2 , is
In equilibrium, the individual effort (e i ) is inversely proportional to the cost c per trial. Through the experiments, we would like to validate whether individual actions are consistent with this conclusion from the model. Therefore our first hypothesis is: 
Details of Experimental Design
As briefly mentioned earlier, the human subjects participated in a function minimization game. The subjects competed in groups of two to find the minimal point of a randomly generated convex function, F(x) = (x − a) 2 + b, where a and b are randomly chosen for each period from a uniform random distribution, uni f [−70, 70]. Even though F(x) had only one minimum because of the quadratic nature of the expression, that information was never revealed.
In this game, the subjects were allowed to sample multiple x values. After every sampling attempt, the subjects were informed of the corresponding F(x) values. The number of times the subject i chooses to sample corresponds to the effort e i .
After both subjects finished sampling, the winner was picked as the subject choosing the x that generates the minimal F(x).
Ties are broken randomly. If i is the winner, the payment he/she receives is (Π = 200) tokens minus the cost (c × e i ) incurred for each sampling of x. If however i loses, he/she gains zero tokens but still incurs the cost (c × e i ) for the samplings.
Notice that this game portrays the design innovation context well because often designers put in the effort to predict the outcome. Also the winner-takes-all and the loser-takes-nothing reward structure is reflective of the crowdsourcing context.
These characterizations are also consistent with prior related game theoretic models [37] . In particular, effort is proportional to the number of tries. Further, the quality of the solution is dependent on the number of tries, and the strategies for the tries.
We conducted the experiment in four sessions. Multiple subjects participated in each session. However, a subject was allowed to participate in only one session. Since our interest was in characterizing how the participants' behaviors change with varying costs, we consider two different cost levels for sampling. Therefore, every session involved two treatments: a) a low-cost treatment, where the per unit sampling cost was c = 10 tokens; and b) a high-cost treatment, where the per unit sampling cost was c = 20 tokens. The subjects played 15 iterations of the function minimization game under each treatment.
Each iteration is hereafter referred to as a period. Table 2 describes in detail the number of subjects in each session and the sequence within each session. Note that treatments were staggered differently across the sessions. This is done so that we can minimize any potential order effects.
Observe that within each session, there could be multiple groups. Usually, when experiments involve groups, experimenters have to choose between the strangers or partners matching protocols. Our experiment employed a strangersmatching protocol. So, before each period began, subjects were randomly re-matched with a different group of subjects.
Moreover, subjects were never informed of their groups' composition or about individual effort levels of their group members. We chose the strangers matching for two reasons. First, it allows us to experimentally capture the equilibrium for the one-shot game [43] . Second, it minimizes the reputation effects and also the potential for collusions.
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Toward the end of each session, we paid the subjects as follows. The subjects were paid their earnings from 10 randomly chosen periods. One of the main reasons to do that is to ensure that the subjects play truthfully in each period and don't subject themselves to end of experiment effects in later periods. The tokens were converted to actual dollars at a rate specified before the experiment began.
The experiment was conducted at Purdue University in the Fall of 2014. Subjects were recruited by email, and using the laboratory's on-line recruitment system. The computerized experimental environment was implemented using z-Tree [44] .
Subjects were randomly assigned to individual computers, and communication was not allowed during the sessions. Copies of the experiment instructions were provided to each subject and were read aloud by the experiment administrator. A screenshot of the interface used by the participants is shown in Figure 2 . The average earning per subject was $10. 
Results and Discussion
To minimize the effect of learning on our analysis, we discard the initial 5 periods under each treatment. Hence, the analyses henceforth will only consider the agents' behaviors in the remaining 10 periods. Specifically, we use the results to test the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.2.
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Hypothesis 1: As the cost per trial, c, increases, the expected number of tries, E(e), decreases
The mean and standard deviation of the number of tries (e) are shown in Table 3 Note that each individual participated in both the low and high-cost treatments. It is observed that the average number of tries (e) for the low cost treatment is greater than average in the high cost treatment in both experimental settings. To validate this, we conducted a paired two-sample t-test. The results of the test are shown in Table 4 . Since the p-value is less than the level of significance (α = 0.01), we conclude that the mean value of the number of tries in the low-cost treatment is higher. Further, to test whether the conclusion is independent of the initial conditions (i.e., whether they start with the low cost treatment or the high cost treatment), we conduct a Welch two sample t-test. Based on the results shown in Table 4 , we conclude that the the null hypothesis is rejected with the level of significance (α = 0.01). Hence, the experimental results are consistent with the prediction from the model that a higher cost per trial (c) results in a lower expected number of tries (e).
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Hypothesis 2: The solution quality is monotonically increasing with the number of tries
The best value of the function, f (x i ), submitted by participant i at the end of each period is used to evaluate whether he/she wins during that period. The quality of the solution is a monotonically decreasing function of the distance between this best value and the optimum value f (x * ). Hence, we use ∆ = f (x i ) − f (x * ) to test this hypothesis.
Out of the 880 total observations, 12 observations had e i = 0, i.e., the participants did not try at all. We ignored these observations. The values of ∆ for each e in the low-cost first sessions (Sessions 1 and 4) and the high-cost first sessions (Sessions 2 and 3) are plotted in Figures 3 and 4 respectively on a semi-log scale. The regression indicates a decreasing exponential relationship between expected value of ∆ and e. 
The regression model in Equation (18) can be compared to the exponential quality function in Table 1 , i.e.,
If we assume an inverse relationship between ∆ and the quality q (i.e., ∆ = 1 q ), then
Hence, the exponential quality function is a good choice for the analytical model, and the parameters of the quality function are directly available from the experimental results.
Hypothesis 3:
Increasing the number of tries, e i , increases the probability of winning, P i
To test this hypothesis, we separated the datasets according to whether or not a participant won during a given period.
The average values and the standard deviations of the number of tries, categorized by the winning status are presented in Table 6 . From the table, we observe that the participants who won, tried more times on average than the ones who lost.
For example, in the low-cost first setting, the average number of tries for winners (µ LW e = 8.21 ) is greater than the average number of tries for participants who did not win (µ LN e = 6.52).
The quantitative impact of the number of tries on the winning probability is assessed by performing a logistic regression between e and a boolean variable b which is 1 if the participant wins, and 0 otherwise. The probability of winning during a period is modeled as
where β 0 and β 1 are regression parameters. Here,ẽ = e 10 for the high cost treatment, andẽ = e 20 in the low cost treatment.
The scaling is carried out because any number of tries beyond the scaling factors would result in a negative expected payoff, see Equation (6).
The estimated parameters for the model in Equation (21) are shown in Table 7 . The statistical significance of the β 0 and β 1 is tested using the Wald chi-square statistic. As shown in the table, the number of tries (e) is a significant predictor of participants' winning probability (p-value< 0.01) for both experimental settings. To interpret the results, we use the odds ratio, which is the ratio of the probability of stopping to the probability of continuing. Using the low cost first setting as an example, for a unit 1 increase in the number of tries, the odds of stopping (versus not stopping) increase by a factor of 11.98. Using the estimated parameter values (β 0 and β 1 ) in Table 7 , we calculate the following winning probabilities as a function of the number of tries (e). As expected, the plots show that for a given number of tries, the predicted probability of winning is higher in the highcost treatment compared to the low-cost treatment, for both settings. In addition, we observe that the probability of winning is also dependent on the initial cost setting. Specifically, for e > 3, the predicted winning probability for a given number of tries is higher in the high-cost first setting, as compared to the low-cost first setting.
One possible reason for this trend is that individuals may be trying less number of times if they participate in the high cost first sessions. To evaluate this assumption, we performed a Welch two sample t-test with a null hypothesis that the average number of tries remains the same, regardless of the initial cost setting; results are shown in Table 8 . It is observed that µ LH e > µ HH e and µ LL e > µ HL e , clearly indicating that when participants start with a high cost setting, they try less number of times as compared to participants who start with a low cost setting. One possible explanation for the behavior is the anchoring bias [45] . Because subjects faced intense competition in the initial treatments when the costs were low, they possibly carried the same tendencies to sample lesser number of times even after transitioning to the high cost setting. The result in Equation (23) is striking, and has implications on multi-stage crowdsourcing competitions. Participant behavior in the initial stages, where the competition may be intense, may have implications on the later stages also.
Finally, the parameters estimated in Table 7 can be related to the parameters in the analytical model presented in Table 1 .
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Comparing this to the probability of winning (for player i = 1) from the analytical model with power form of contest success function and exponential quality function 
we observe that βme 1 = β 1ẽ 1 . Using Equation (19), we get m = − β 1ẽ 1 β 1 e 1 . For the high cost treatment, this reduces to m = − β 1 10β 1 and for the low cost treatment, m = − β 1 20β 1 . The parameters m and β completely describe the analytical model listed in Table 1 .
The hypotheses have important implications for structuring crowdsourcing contests for engineering design. Hypothesis 2 illustrates that the greater the effort from the participants, the higher the solution quality. Hence, it is in the interest of the crowdsourcing contest designer to incentivize participants to invest greater amounts of effort. At the same time, Hypothesis 1 indicates the effect of cost of gathering information on the effort invested by the participants. Lower cost results in greater effort. Hence, if the contest designer wants the participants to generate and evaluate a large number of alternate designs, the cost of developing and evaluating each design must be low. Finally, the results from Hypothesis 3 provide insights on how participants' behaviors (e.g., the effort invested) may depend on the task sequence.
